


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USSR: Moscow has reaffirmed its determination to work for a European security conference and a Middle East settlement.

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USSR: MOSCOW HAS REAFFIRMED ITS DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT HAS CHARGED THE US WITH FRUSTRATING ITS EFFORTS.

IN A CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR BEAM IN MOSCOW ON 7 JANUARY, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO RELAYED THE KREMLIN'S VIEWS ON SEVERAL MATTERS OF JOINT CONCERN. ON THE QUESTION OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, GROMYKO SAID THAT US AND CANADIAN PARTICIPATION WAS "CLEAR" PROVIDED THAT BOTH GERMAN STATES WOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED. HE IMPLIED THAT THE US WAS OPPOSING THE SOVIET-SPONSORED CONFERENCE BY INSISTING THAT THE PROPOSED AGENDA INCLUDE ISSUES, SUCH AS BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, THAT HAVE BEEN IN DISPUTE FOR 25 YEARS.

GROMYKO ARGUED THAT OTHER LIMITED STEPS TOWARD DETENTE SUCH AS THE TEST BAN, NPT, AND SALT WOULD NEVER HAVE BEGUN HAD MOSCOW ADOPTED AS NEGATIVE AN ATTITUDE AS THE US SEEMS TO BE TAKING ON THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. NONETHELESS, HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT FAVORED BILATERAL TALKS TO IRON OUT SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS. GROMYKO'S STRONG REMARKS WERE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO PROD THE US INTO COMING OUT WITH A FORMAL POSITION ON THE SUBJECT.

ON THE MIDDLE EAST, GROMYKO SAID THAT MOSCOW WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE BILATERAL AND FOUR-POWER TALKS.

25X1 [REDACTED] HE IMPLIED, HOWEVER, THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT DEPENDED ON A CHANGE OF ATTITUDES AND POLICIES IN WASHINGTON AND TEL AVIV, NOT IN MOSCOW. HE AGAIN DESCRIBED RECENT US PROPOSALS AS ONE-SIDED AND CLAIMED THAT IT WAS "HARD TO UNDERSTAND" US ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ISRAELIS SINCE THE SITUATION MIGHT AGAIN GET OUT OF HAND. NOTHING GROMYKO SAID ON THE PROBLEM WAS NEW, AND ALTHOUGH HE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY, HE DID NOT REFER TO THE RECENT MILITARY CLASHES IN THE REGION.

TOUCHING BRIEFLY ON THE RECENT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS IN HELSINKI, GROMYKO SAID THAT SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS THERE HAD ONLY BEEN "SLIGHT." HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT MOSCOW HAS NOT YET DRAWN ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE US POSITION AND THAT THE NEXT PHASE OF SALT WOULD PRESUMABLY DEAL WITH SOME OF THE MORE BASIC ISSUES.

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